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Recent Developments

Bentley v. Carroll
Jury Instructions Stating that Statutory Violations Are Evidence of Negligence
Are Permissible
By George Mahaffey, Jr.

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a
medical patient was entitled to a jury
instruction stating that the violation of
a statute may be considered evidence
of negligence. Bentley v. Carroll,
355 Md. 312, 734 A.2d 697 (1999).
Moreover, the court concluded that
when ajury is determining causation
in a medical malpractice case, it may
consider non-expert as well as expert
medical testimony. The court of
appeals also held that an expert may
not offer an opinion as to the
truthfulness of a party, but may only
offer an opinion based on the facts
sufficient to show the basis for that
opinion.
Beginning in 1978 and
continuing until 1988, then two-year
old Christine Ann Bentley ("Bentley'')
received medical treatment from Dr.
Alan Carroll ("Carroll") and the late
Dr. GeorgeL. Morningstar for a series
of afflictions including urination
problems and vaginal inflammation.
During this same ten-year period,
Bentley had allegedly been sexually
abused by her mother's boyfriend on
a regular basis.
In 1996, Bentley filed suit
against Carroll, the estate of George
L. Morningstar, and Morningstar and
Carroll, P .A., in the Circuit Court for
Frederick County, alleging medical
malpra9tice. Bentley claimed that
Carroll breached the standard of

medical care by failing to report, as
required by Article 27, section 35A
ofthe Maryland Annotated Code that
the sexual abuse of a child was
possibly occurring. Bentley proposed
the jury instruction that violation ofa
statute could be considered evidence
of negligence which the trial court
refused. The jury returned a verdict
in favor ofCarroll, and a timely appeal
was noted to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, sua sponte,
granted certiorari.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by examining Article 27,
section 35A of the Maryland
Annotated Code, Maryland's Child
Abuse Act, and Bentley's proposed
jury instruction. Bentley, 355 Md. at
318,320, 734 A.2d at 701-02. In
examining Bentley's proposed
instructions in conjunction with
Maryland Rule 2-520, the court
opined that a requested jury instruction
should be given only if (1) the
instruction correctly states the law; (2)
the matter at issue is not fairly covered
by an instruction already given; and
(3) the law is applicable in light ofthe
evidence before the jury. Id at 32425, 734 A.2d at 704 (citing Holman
v. Kelly Catering, 334 Md. 480, 639
A.2d 701 (1994». Afterapplyingthis
standard to Bentley's proposed
instruction, the court rej ected
Carroll's argument that it would be

inappropriate to include section 35A
in ajury instruction. Id at 326, 734
A.2d 705. Rather, the court of
appeals found that the trial court
erred, in that Bentley's proposed jury
instruction should have been given.
Id. The court of appeals concluded
Bentley's proposed instruction was
legally accurate and its inclusion of
section 35A was appropriate given
the evidence in the instant case. Id
Before continuing, the court
noted that it could have remanded the
case solely on the jury instruction
error, but in the interest of providing
guidance for future parties, it would
address the other issues raised by
Bentley. Id at 329, 734A.2dat707.
The court then considered whether
the jury should have been instructed
that it could consider non-expert, as
well as expert testimony, in
determining causation. Id at 32930, 734 A.2d at 707. The court
found that an instruction to ajury is
erroneous if it restricts evidence that
tends to establish material facts. Id
at 331, 734 A.2d at 708 (quoting
Singleton v. Roman, 195 Md. 241,
72 A.2d 705 (1950». Therefore,
the court ofappeals held in the instant
case, that the trial judge improperly
limited the scope of deliberations by
only allowing the jury to consider
expert testimony in determining
causation. Id The court concluded
that the jury should have been
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permitted to consider non-expert
material such as interrogatories and
depositions which may have shed light
on material facts in the case. Id
The court of appeals then
examined whether the trial court erred
in not striking the testimony of an
expert witness who called into
question the victim's veracity. Id at
332, 734 A.2d at 708-09. The expert
testified that based on the results of a
professionally accepted test, Bentley
exhibited no signs ofan individual who
had suffered sexual abuse and may
have exaggerated her symptoms. Id
at 333, 734 A.2d at 709. The expert
further stated that he based his
conclusions on the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory
("MMPI") test which functioned as a
"mini truth, or lie detector .... " Id
The court noted that in Maryland,
courts are not the proper forum for
the introduction or interpretation of
devices that measure a witness's
veracity. Id. at 334, 734 A.2d at 709
(citing Guesfeirdv. State, 300 Md.
653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984)). The
court additionally stated that Maryland
courts have consistently held that an
expert witness may not give his
opinion as to the truthfulness of a
witness. Id at 334, 734 A.2d at 70910 (citing Bohnert v. State, 312 Md.
266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988)). In the
instant case, the court held Carroll's
expert's reliance on what he perceived
to be a "truth detector," coupled with
his comments as to the veracity of
Bentley, were impermissibly
prejudicial and thus, inadmissible as a
matter oflaw. Id. at 335, 734 A.2d
at 710.
Finally, the court addressed
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whether Bentley's expert's opinion
that Bentley's injuries were the result
of sexual abuse was admissible. Id
The court first noted that an expert
witness may not offer an opinion
based solely on the complainant's
version of the cause of his or her
injuries. Id at 330, 734 A.2d at 710
(citing Bohnert v. State, 312 Md.
266,539 A.2d 657 (1988)). Rather,
the expert opinion must be based on
facts that sufficiently show the basis
for their opinion. Id In the instant
case, the court of appeals found that
the expert witness based his opinion
on facts that were insufficient to
support his testimony. Id at336, 734
A.2d at 711. As a result, his testimony
that Bentley's injuries were the result
of sexual abuse impermissibly
bolstered the credibility and argument
of Bentley. !d. at 338, 734 A.2d at
712.
The court of appeals's holding
in Bentley supports the rights ofthose
seeking redress for sexual abuse. The
court clearly articulated that abuse
victims are entitled to a jury instruction
that considers a violation of
Maryland's Child Abuse Act as
evidence ofnegligence. This decision
will make it easier for victims to show
a breach of the standard of care by
physicians, in that it expands the
amount of evidence that juries can
consider. In addition,juries will not
be restricted solely to considering
expert testimony, but will be allowed
to consider non-expert testimony that
might emotionally swing ajury.

